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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALARCON, Circuit Judge. 
 
Michael T. Wilburn ("Wilburn") was injured when he was 
swept off the deck of the tug, the Enterprise, by a huge 
wave during a storm. He filed an action against his 
employer, Maritrans GP Inc. ("Maritrans") to recover 
damages for negligence pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. S 688, and for the unseaworthiness of the Enterprise 
under general maritime law. 
 
At trial Wilburn did not present any expert testimony in 
support of his theories of liability. The jury found that 
Maritrans was negligent and that the Enterprise was 
unseaworthy. The district court granted Maritrans's 
motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial 
on the basis that the evidence was insufficient because 
Wilburn failed to present expert testimony. The court ruled 
that the facts and circumstances of the case were beyond 
the common knowledge and experience of the jurors. The 
court also found that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury's award of damages. 
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We conclude that an expert's testimony was not required 
to support the jury's finding of liability as to one of 
Wilburn's theories of negligence. The failure to require the 
jury to return special verdicts, however, precludes us from 
determining which theory or theories of negligence and 
unseaworthiness were adopted by the jury. We also hold 
that the district court erred in excluding lay opinion 
testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment as a 
matter of law and we affirm the district court's order 
granting a new trial as to liability. Regarding damages, we 
hold that the evidence was sufficient to show a narrowing 
of Wilburn's economic opportunities, however, it was 
insufficient to support the jury's award of damages. We 
therefore reverse the district court's judgment as a matter 
of law and affirm the order granting a new trial with respect 
to damages. 
 
I 
 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
Wilburn seeks reversal of the district court's orders on 
the following grounds: 
 
One. The district court abused its discretion in 
precluding lay witnesses from presenting opinion testimony 
based on facts within their personal knowledge. 
 
Two. The district erred as a matter of law in ruling that 
expert testimony was required because a rational jury could 
not comprehend the primary facts and draw a correct 
conclusion regarding whether the captain of the Enterprise 
acted negligently and whether the Enterprise was 
seaworthy. 
 
Three. The district court erred in concluding that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the jury's award of two 
million dollars in damages. 
 
We discuss each contention and the facts pertinent 
thereto under separate headings. 
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II 
 
LIABILITY 
 
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 
During trial, Wilburn's counsel requested the court's 
permission to introduce the lay opinion of Charles Stanley, 
the barge captain, and Wilburn regarding the cause of 
Wilburn's injuries based on their experience working on 
tugs and barges. Maritrans's counsel objected on the 
ground that Wilburn and Stanley had not been listed or 
identified as experts as required by Rule 26(a)(2)(A) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defense counsel argued 
that Stanley and Wilburn's opinion testimony was 
precluded by the court's April 18, 1996 pretrial order. The 
order reads as follows: 
 
       IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff is precluded 
       from offering at the time of trial of this matter, any 
       expert opinions and other expert evidence which have 
       not been provided to defendant by March 15, 1996. 
 
The order was issued in response to Maritrans's motion to 
compel discovery filed on November 20, 1995 and its 
January 23, 1996 motion in limine for an order precluding 
Wilburn from offering any expert opinions or other expert 
evidence. 
 
The district court sustained Maritrans's objection to the 
introduction of the opinions of Wilburn's lay witnesses 
because they had not been listed as experts in response to 
the district court's pre-trial order. In so ruling, the district 
court appears to have concluded that Rule 26(a)(2)(A) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure compels disclosure of the 
fact that an identified lay witness will also testify regarding 
his or her opinion concerning a fact in issue. To the extent 
that the district court's exclusion of the opinions of lay 
witnesses was based on an interpretation of Rule 
26(a)(2)(A), our review is plenary. See International Union, 
UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 917 F.2d 107, 110 (3d Cir. 
1990). We must also decide whether the district court's 
ruling was consistent with Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of 
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Evidence. We review independently a district court's 
interpretation of Rule 701. See Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton 
Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 1194 (3d Cir. 1995); U.S. v. 
Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 
Pursuant to Rule 26(a), a party must disclose certain 
evidence to the other parties in the action without awaiting 
a discovery request. A party is expressly required to 
disclose "the identity of any person who may be used at 
trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). "If 
a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), 
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for 
appropriate sanctions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A). 
 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides as 
follows: 
 
       If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
       or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
       expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or 
       education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion 
       or otherwise. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Wilburn and Stanley were not called by 
the plaintiff to testify as expert witnesses. Wilburn's 
counsel informed the district court that as lay witnesses 
"[t]hey will render opinion evidence about this situation, 
but they are not experts. They have not been retained as 
such nor are they specially in this case, because they give 
expert testimony." 
 
Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a lay 
witness to provide opinion evidence. Rule 701 states: 
 
       If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the 
       witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences 
       is limited to those opinions or inferences which are 
       (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness 
       and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' 
       testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 701. 
 
Rule 701 permits evidence that is considered " `shorthand 
renditions' of a total situation, or . . . statements of 
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collective facts." Asplundh at 1196 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted). These are situations where 
"the differences between fact and opinion blur and it is 
difficult or cumbersome for the examiner to elicit an answer 
from the witness that will not be expressed in the form of 
an opinion." Id. at 1198. 
 
There is, however, a trend towards an even more liberal 
construction of Rule 701. "[Rule 701] jurisprudence has 
expanded beyond this core area to permit lay persons to 
express opinions that are not shorthand statements of fact, 
so long as the personal knowledge, rational basis, and 
helpfulness standards of Rule 701 are met." Id. The rational 
basis prong requires that the witnesses' opinion be 
"grounded in either experience or specialized knowledge." 
Asplundh Mfg. Div. v. Benton Harbor Eng'g, 57 F.3d 1190, 
1198 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Today, "[a] lay witness with first hand knowledge can 
offer an opinion akin to expert testimony in most cases, so 
long as the trial judge determines that the witness 
possesses sufficient and relevant specialized knowledge or 
experience to offer the opinion." Id. at 1201-02. "The 
essential difference between [Rule 701 and 702 testimony] 
. . . is that a qualified expert may answer hypothetical 
questions." Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 
404 (3d Cir. 1980). Moreover, Rule 704 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence authorizes the admission of the opinion of lay 
witnesses regarding the ultimate issues to be decided by 
the trier of fact. Fed. R. Evid. 704. 
 
Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does 
not require a party to provide the name of any person who 
may be used at trial to present evidence under Rule 701. 
Because disclosure of a lay witness's opinion testimony is 
not required by Rule 26(a)(2)(A), the district court lacked 
the power to sanction Wilburn solely because he failed to 
disclose the fact that he and Stanley would be testifying 
regarding their opinions as to a fact in issue. 
 
This court confronted a similar situation in Teen-Ed, Inc. 
v. Kimball Int'l Inc., 620 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1980). In Teen- 
Ed, the district court rejected a lay witness's opinion 
testimony because the appellant failed to identify him 
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before trial as an expert witness. See id. at 404. This court 
noted that the district court "failed to distinguish between 
opinion testimony which may be introduced by lay 
witnesses and that which requires experts." Id. at 403. In 
reversing the district court's ruling, this court held as 
follows: "We interpret the pre-trial ruling in this case to 
have required identification of expert witnesses under Rules 
702 and 703, but not of lay witnesses under Rule 701." Id. 
at 404. 
 
The district court also erred in failing to determine 
whether Wilburn and Stanley, as percipient witnesses to 
the events that occurred before Wilburn was tossed from 
the deck of the Enterprise by a gigantic wave, possessed the 
requisite knowledge or experience to provide opinion 
testimony. 
 
The district court's error in excluding the opinions of lay 
witnesses prevented Wilburn from presenting evidence in 
support of his theories that the negligence of an employee 
of Maritrans and the unseaworthiness of the Enterprise 
were the direct cause of his injuries. A defendant is not 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the basis that 
the evidence is insufficient if the trial court has erroneously 
excluded relevant and admissible evidence. See Scott v. 
Plante, 641 F.2d 117, 136 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated on other 
grounds, 458 U.S. 1101 (1982). Accordingly, we must 
reverse the judgment as a matter of law, entered pursuant 
to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
regarding Maritrans's liability for negligence and 
unseaworthiness. 
 
B. Motion for a New Trial 
 
Our reversal of the order granting judgment as a matter 
of law requires us to consider the district court's 
conditional grant of a new trial pursuant to Rule 50(c)(1). 
Wilburn contends that the district court erred in 
concluding as a matter of law that the evidence regarding 
liability was insufficient because of his failure to present a 
maritime expert to prove negligence and unseaworthiness. 
Wilburn disputes the district court's finding that "the facts 
and circumstances presented in this case were beyond the 
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realm of knowledge and experience of the jurors." This 
court exercises plenary review when the grant of a motion 
for new trial is based on the application of a legal precept. 
See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 
1095 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
"The duty of the vessel owner to furnish a reasonably 
safe place for a seaman . . . to perform his chores is clearly 
a duty of care, the breach of which results in liability for 
negligence . . . ." Earles v. Union Barge Line Corp., 486 F.2d 
1097, 1104 (3d Cir. 1973). Under the Jones Act, an 
employer is liable for injury suffered by a seaman through 
the negligence of the employer or a fellow employee. See 
Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 634 (3d Cir. 
1990) (citing De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 
660-65 (1943)). As the district court instructed the jury, 
"negligence requires the defendant to guard against those 
risks or dangers of which it knew, or by the exercise of due 
care, should have known. . . . [T]he defendant's duty is 
measured by what a reasonably prudent person would 
anticipate or foresee resulting from particular 
circumstances." The standard of proof for causation is 
relaxed in cases filed pursuant to the Jones Act. Causation 
is satisfied if "the proofs justify with reason the conclusion 
that employer negligence played any part, even the 
slightest, in producing the injury . . . ." Rogers v. Missouri 
Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957). 
 
The evidence established the following facts concerning 
the events that occurred aboard the Enterprise on 
November 9, 1992. On that date, Wilburn was employed as 
an able-bodied tankerman ("AB tankerman") on the 
Enterprise. The Enterprise was en route from Corpus 
Christi, Texas to New York. It was pushing the Ocean 262, 
a 590 foot barge. The barge was loaded with crude oil. 
 
Pushing is the most efficient method of transporting 
cargo in a tug-barge configuration in fair weather. In that 
setup, the bow of the tug is inserted in a deep, v-shaped 
notch in the stern of the barge. Lines are used to secure the 
tug's bow to the barge's stern. In stormy weather, the tug- 
barge configuration must be changed so that the tug pulls 
the barge using a hawser cable. 
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The weather was uneventful on the morning and 
afternoon of November 9, 1992 as the Enterprise pushed 
the barge north along the coast of Florida. Weather 
conditions began to deteriorate steadily in the early evening 
hours. By 6:00 p.m., the wind had reached twenty-five to 
thirty miles per hour, and the waves were eight to ten feet 
high. 
 
At approximately 9:00 p.m., Norval Hearn, the captain of 
the Enterprise, contacted the National Weather Service 
because it was evident that weather conditions were 
worsening. Up until that point, he had been receiving 
reports indicating that weather conditions would improve. 
For that reason, he did not decide to get out of the notch 
earlier. Captain Hearn was informed that the Enterprise 
was in the worst possible place it could be in relation to the 
storm. At that time, the Enterprise was approximately 
seventeen and one-half miles off the Florida coast. Captain 
Hearn was advised to leave the area as soon as possible. 
 
After receiving this report, Captain Hearn conferred with 
Herb Potter, the chief engineer. Potter informed Captain 
Hearn that there was no other choice except to get out of 
the notch and switch to a pulling configuration to avoid 
tearing up the tug and the barge. The wind was blowing in 
one direction and the waves were coming from the opposite 
direction. These forces caused the Enterprise to move back 
out of the notch and then slam into the barge because the 
two vessels were connected together by the Samson line. 
The wave action was also causing the tug's fendering 
system to ride on top of the combing of the barge. If the tug 
twisted in the notch under such circumstances, it could 
tear out the side of the Enterprise and cause it to sink. 
Potter also testified that while he and Captain Hearn were 
discussing exiting the notch, Captain Hearn attempted to 
change course in an effort to minimize the impact of the 
wave action. In every position he attempted, however, the 
conditions got worse. 
 
Captain Hearn testified that he considered going into port 
or one of the nearby inlets off the coast. He was concerned, 
however, that the easterly weather was causing the seas to 
build up close to shore and the tides would be rising, 
making the vessels hard to control and navigation unsafe 
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through the inlets. He also considered going closer to shore, 
but was concerned that the tug would run aground because 
of its thirty-six foot six inch draft. At the time of the 
incident, the Enterprise was seventeen to twenty miles off- 
shore, and the ocean was approximately 876 feet deep at 
that distance from shore. Captain Hearn testified that even 
though running aground was not an immediate problem, he 
didn't think the weather conditions would be any better 
closer to shore. Although the weather reports indicated that 
conditions at shore might be milder, he didn't trust the 
reports because they didn't reflect the extremely bad 
weather that the tug was experiencing. Maritrans's weather 
expert also testified that the reports received by the 
Enterprise did not reflect the weather that the tugboat was 
experiencing, but did accurately reflect the weather at 
shore. 
 
Captain Hearn also testified that dropping anchor and 
waiting out the storm was not a feasible option. Because of 
the depth of the ocean, he did not think they had enough 
anchor chain. Moreover, the anchor was located on the bow 
of the barge and waves were breaking over the bow; it 
would have been unsafe to send someone to drop anchor 
under those conditions. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that Captain Hearn had 
concluded at approximately 9:00 p.m. that the current 
storm conditions compelled switching the Enterprise from 
the pushing setup to a towing configuration, he stayed the 
course and the Enterprise continued to push northward in 
the notch position until 10:40 p.m.. By then, the wind 
velocity was forty to fifty miles per hour. The waves had 
increased in height to eighteen to twenty-two feet. At that 
time, Captain Hearn ordered the crew to back the 
Enterprise out of the notch. To carry out this maneuver, it 
was necessary to release the Samson line connecting the 
tug to the barge. Disconnecting the Samson line can be 
accomplished in three ways: It can be released from the 
bow of the tug in which case the Samson line will trail 
harmlessly behind the barge until it is hauled aboard. It 
can be released from the stern of the barge and left 
connected to the tug. Because the Samson line can get 
caught in the tug's propellers, however, it must be hauled 
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aboard the tug by members of the crew using a capstan. 
The line can also be released from both vessels and left in 
the water; although, this also creates a risk that it will get 
caught in the tug's propellers. 
 
Captain Hearn testified that the most prudent choice 
during severe storm conditions would be to release the 
Samson line from the bow of the tug so that it would trail 
behind the barge. This choice would permit the crew to 
seek refuge below deck. 
 
There is a conflict in the evidence regarding whether 
Captain Hearn ordered the Samson line disconnected from 
the tug or the barge. Captain Hearn testified that he 
ordered it disconnected from the bow of the tug. Charles 
Stanley, the barge captain, testified that Captain Hearn 
ordered him to disconnect the Samson line from the stern 
of the barge. After members of the crew on board the 
Enterprise slacked the Samson line, Stanley disconnected 
the line and threw it off the barge. Stanley testified that 
Captain Hearn directed him to let the Samson line go. 
According to Stanley, Captain Hearn stated: "Lose the line." 
Stanley testified that this command meant: "Let it go in the 
water. We don't need it; Don't waste any time trying to 
collect it." Stanley stated that Captain Hearn changed his 
mind, however, and ordered him to "[s]ave the line if you 
can." Stanley ordered Bill Shelley, a crew member, to turn 
on the capstan located on the bow of the Enterprise in order 
to retrieve the Samson line. 
 
Captain Hearn testified that he did not order Stanley to 
"lose the line," or detach it from the Enterprise after it had 
been released from the barge. Rather, he ordered the 
Samson line hauled on board the tug after Stanley failed to 
disconnect it in accordance with his instructions. Captain 
Hearn issued this order because he was afraid the Samson 
line would get caught in the tug's propellers. 
 
Wilburn and other crew members proceeded to assist in 
hauling the Samson line aboard the Enterprise. While the 
Samson line was being reeled in, the Enterprise went over 
a huge wave and then plunged down into another wave. A 
wall of water crashed down on the bow of the Enterprise, 
lifted Wilburn up, and carried him thirty feet beyond the 
side of the tug. 
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After Wilburn went overboard, Captain Hearn called the 
United States Coast Guard and informed them that they 
had a man overboard. As the tug swung back around to 
find Wilburn, the crew focused a spotlight on him. After 
several attempts to throw Wilburn a life ring, the crew 
finally succeeded. A crew member informed Wilburn that a 
helicopter would be there in five minutes. The crew was 
unaware, however, that the Coast Guard could not send a 
cutter to Wilburn because of the heavy seas. Believing he 
would only have to wait a short time, Wilburn decided not 
to board the tug because he was concerned that he might 
be slammed against the hull. In order to avoid that risk to 
Wilburn, the crew added another piece of line to the life line 
so that Wilburn could swim farther away from the 
Enterprise. Despite the extra line, Wilburn was pulled 
underwater as the tug reacted to the eighteen to twenty-two 
foot waves. The crew was forced to let the line go. Wilburn 
began to drift away from the tug to a point where the 
spotlight could no longer focus on him. Finally, after being 
in the water for two hours, a Coast Guard helicopter 
rescued Wilburn and transported him to a hospital. 
 
Maritrans urges us to affirm the district court's 
determination that expert testimony was required in this 
matter because 
 
       the incident involves complex, technical, and 
       specialized areas of the maritime experience and 
       practice, knowledge of vessel characteristics and 
       functions, ocean-going navigation, vessel handling, sea 
       going operations and procedures, and safety at sea, all 
       areas about which a jury must have guidance before it 
       can make a determination. 
 
Appellee's Br. at 27. 
 
The Supreme Court has instructed that 
 
       expert testimony not only is unnecessary but indeed 
       may be properly excluded in the discretion of the trial 
       judge "if all the primary facts can be accurately and 
       intelligibly described to the jury, and if they, as men of 
       common understanding, are as capable of 
       comprehending the primary facts and of drawing 
       correct conclusions from them as are witnesses pos- 
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       sessed of special or peculiar training, experience, or 
       observation in respect to the subject under 
       investigation . . . ." 
 
Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) 
(quoting United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 407. 
415 (8th Cir. 1909)). We must decide whether persons of 
common understanding could comprehend the primary 
facts offered by Wilburn to demonstrate the cause of his 
injuries. 
 
One of the negligence theories presented to the jury was 
whether a reasonable person would anticipate or foresee 
that disconnecting the Samson line from the barge and 
creating the need for the crew to be on the deck to retrieve 
it under the prevailing extreme weather and sea conditions 
could produce an injury to the plaintiff. The jury received 
photographs that permitted it to visualize the bow of the 
Enterprise in the notch. The severe nature of the storm and 
the immensity of the eighteen to twenty-two feet waves were 
vividly described by Captain Hearn and other members of 
the crew. The jury also heard Captain Hearn's testimony 
that releasing the Samson line from the Enterprise was the 
safest procedure under the extraordinary circumstances 
they were confronting in order to keep the crew safely off 
the deck. 
 
The district court relied on three cases in support of its 
conclusion that expert testimony was required regarding 
each of Wilburn's negligence theories. In Smith v. United 
Gas Pipeline Co., 857 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(unpublished table opinion), an unpublished opinion 
discussed in Peters v. Five Star Marine Service, 898 F.2d 
448 (5th Cir. 1990), the trial judge refused to allow a 
maritime operations expert to testify as to the 
reasonableness of a ship-to-ship transfer of machinery dur- 
ing rough seas. Without the guidance of an expert, the jury 
was asked to gauge the reasonableness of using a ship's 
crane equipped with a "headache ball" and a shackle 
without a "tag line" while the two ships were stern-to-stern 
in heavy seas. See id. at 450. The Fifth Circuit held in 
Smith that "[t]he trial judge abused his discretion in 
deciding that an analysis of the confluences of these factors 
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was within the realm of the average juror's knowledge and 
experience." Id. 
 
In Peters, the court distinguished Smith by holding that 
a jury could determine from its common knowledge and 
experience "whether it was reasonable for an employer to 
instruct his employee to manually move equipment on the 
deck of a boat during heavy seas." Id. We agree with the 
court's reasoning in Peters, and the distinction it drew 
between the factual question presented in that matter as 
opposed to the complex and technical engineering question 
that faced the jury in Smith. 
 
In Martin v. United Fruit Co., 272 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1959), 
the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's decision to 
exclude from the jury's consideration the question whether 
the placement of a hinge at the bottom of a deadlight was 
an improper method of ship construction. See id. at 349. 
The court held that "expert knowledge of nautical 
architecture is required in order to form an intelligent 
judgment." Id. 
 
In Fatovic v. Nederlandsch-Ameridaansche Stoomvaart, 
Maatschappij, 275 F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1960), the Second 
Circuit held that the district court erred in submitting to 
the jury the plaintiff's theory that the vessel was 
unseaworthy because of the absence of a stopping 
arrangement that could have feasibly been constructed to 
prevent a boom from swinging against the kingpost causing 
the plaintiff's injury. The court held that the plaintiff had 
failed to present any evidence to support this theory. See 
id. at 190. In dictum, the court observed that "[i]n any 
event, the question was one of nautical architecture about 
which jurors lack the knowledge to form an intelligent 
judgment in the absence of expert testimony." Id. (citing 
Martin v. United Fruit Co., 272 F.2d 347 (2nd Cir. 1959)). 
Unlike Martin and Fatovic, in the matter sub judice, no 
question of the construction of either vessel was at issue. 
 
The jury did not require expert testimony in order to 
understand that the only reason Wilburn was on the deck 
of the tug, and consequently in a position where he could 
get washed overboard by a wave, was because he was 
ordered to haul the Samson line on board the tug during a 
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violent storm that was producing enormous waves, which 
caused the ship to roll and pitch. It was also easily 
comprehendible to a person of common understanding that 
if the Samson line had been disconnected from the 
Enterprise rather than the barge, there would have been no 
need to haul the Samson line on board the tug. The jury 
could have found that Maritrans was liable for negligence 
because the Samson line was not released in a manner that 
was reasonably prudent under the exigent circumstances 
confronting the persons aboard the Enterprise. 
 
Because Maritrans was responsible for the acts of all its 
employees, see Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 
634 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing De Zon v. American President 
Lines, 318 U.S. 660-65 (1943)), the evidence was sufficient 
to demonstrate to the jury that Maritrans was liable 
without the aid of expert testimony whether Captain Hearn 
directed the release of the Samson line from the barge or 
whether, instead, Stanley did so in violation of Captain 
Hearn's order. 
 
Having determined that the district court erred in 
concluding that the evidence was insufficient to 
demonstrate negligence on any of the theories asserted by 
Wilburn in the absence of expert testimony, we must now 
consider whether the district court's order granting 
Maritrans a new trial may stand notwithstanding the 
district court's erroneous ruling. We may affirm a district 
court's judgment if the result it reached is correct although 
we disagree with its reasoning. See PAAC v. Rizzo, 502 F.2d 
306, 308 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1974). 
 
Wilburn argued to the jury that Captain Hearn 
committed several negligent acts each of which caused his 
injuries. The acts were as follows: 1) the inabili ty to 
maneuver the vessels out of the effects of the storm; 2) the 
captain's decision to heed the initial weather forecasts and 
not leave the notch earlier; 3) the decision not t o take the 
vessels in-shore or to port; 4) the decision not t o drop 
anchor; 5) the manner of releasing the Samson line ; 6) the 
decision not to remain in the notch after the lines were 
removed; and 7) the failure to anticipate a large wave. 
 
Unfortunately, the jury was not presented with special 
verdict forms concerning Wilburn's discrete theories of 
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negligent conduct. As a result, we cannot determine from 
the record whether the jury found that Captain Hearn was 
negligent in ordering the Samson line released from the 
barge, or whether the verdict was based on a finding that 
he acted negligently in the performance of one of the other 
alleged negligent acts. 
 
We are persuaded that the question whether Captain 
Hearn was negligent in failing to change course and 
maneuver the vessels shoreward or in his decision not to 
leave the notch earlier was beyond the common knowledge 
possessed by the members of the jury. These decisions 
require a knowledge of the navigation and operation of an 
ocean going tug and barge in bad weather. Where a jury 
has returned a general verdict and one theory of liability is 
not sustained by the evidence or legally sound, the verdict 
cannot stand because the court cannot determine whether 
the jury based its verdict on an improper ground. See 
Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Nowell v. Universal Elec. Co., 792 F.2d 1310, 
1312 (5th Cir. 1986). Although we have determined that 
expert testimony was not required to support Wilburn's 
theory that Maritrans was liable for negligence because the 
Samson line was released from the barge, the verdict 
cannot stand because we conclude that the question 
whether any of Captain Hearn's navigational decisions were 
negligent was outside the common knowledge of the jury. 
 
We do not reach the question whether Wilburn and 
Stanley possess the requisite knowledge and experience to 
present their lay opinions on the navigation of a tug and 
barge during a storm to guide the jury in reaching a proper 
verdict, or whether expert testimony is required for this 
purpose. 
 
The jury also found that the Enterprise was unseaworthy. 
Wilburn alleged four theories of unseaworthiness: one, 
there was no company policy or procedures for dealing with 
rough weather; two, the tug failed to have enough life line 
on board to aid Wilburn once he went overboard; three, the 
Samson line fouled on itself as it was being hauled onto the 
capstan; and four, the captain and his officers were not 
reasonably adequate to perform their assigned tasks of 
navigating the tug out of the storm area or adapting to the 
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weather situation in a timely manner. We conclude that the 
question whether the captain and crew were reasonably 
able to perform their assigned duties was outside the 
common understanding of the jury. The use of a general 
verdict negates the need to determine whether any of the 
other theories of unseaworthiness could be proved without 
expert testimony because we cannot discern from this 
record which theory the jury adopted. 
 
III 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES 
 
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 
In setting forth its reasons for granting the judgment as 
a matter of law, the district court separately concluded that 
the evidence was insufficient to support an award of 
damages for loss of future earning capacity. The district 
court explained its ruling as follows: 
 
       Wilburn produced no evidence regarding what, if any, 
       positions as barge captain were available to him and 
       his prospect of attaining such a position in relation to 
       other qualified individuals. There was no evidence as to 
       when Wilburn could expect to attain such a position, 
       what his anticipated work-life as a barge captain would 
       be, or what salary he would receive. 
 
A plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for loss of 
future earning capacity in Jones Act and FELA cases. See 
Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 57 
F.3d 1269, 1284 (3d Cir. 1995). The plaintiff must produce, 
however, "competent evidence suggesting that his injuries 
have narrowed the range of economic opportunities 
available to him." Gorniak v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 
889 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Wiles v. New York, 
Chicago, and St. Louis R.R. Co., 283 F.2d 328, 332 (3d Cir. 
1960)). 
 
Under the law of this circuit, a plaintiff may recover an 
award for future lost earning capacity, 
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       if he has produced competent evidence suggesting that 
       his injuries have narrowed the range of economic 
       opportunities available to him. This means that a 
       plaintiff need not, as a prerequisite to recovery, prove 
       that in the near future he will earn less money than he 
       would have but for his injury. Rather, a plaintiff must 
       show that his injury has caused a diminution in his 
       ability to earn a living. Such a diminution includes a 
       decreased ability to weather adverse economic 
       circumstances, such as a discharge or lay-off, or to 
       voluntarily leave the defendant employer for other 
       employment. 
 
Id. at 484 (citation omitted). 
 
In Wiles v. New York, Chicago, and St. Louis Railroad Co., 
283 F.2d 328 (3d Cir. 1960), this court reversed the district 
court's order setting aside the jury's award for loss of future 
earning capacity. See id. at 332. Due to his employer's 
negligence, Wiles sustained a back injury and had a series 
of back operations resulting in permanent scars and a 
minor back deformity. See id. at 331. At trial, Wiles 
introduced expert medical testimony showing that, 
 
       he would have difficulty in getting a job in heavy 
       industry elsewhere than with the Railroad for most 
       heavy-industry employers require physical 
       examinations. Such an examination would compel 
       Wiles to disclose the nature of his operations and that 
       he had a history of disc protrusion and back fusion 
       and these disclosures would militate against his 
       securing employment. 
 
Id. Although Wiles was employed with the Railroad at a 
salary greater than what he had been earning at the time 
of his injury, this court held that "[t]he availability to Wiles 
of the labor market for heavy-duty workers was certainly a 
factor which the jury was entitled to take into consideration 
in fixing an amount for damages due to him for loss of 
future earning power." Id. at 332. 
 
In Gorniak v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 889 F.2d 
481 (3d Cir. 1989), Gorniak was injured while working as 
a materials handler for Amtrak. See id. at 482. After his 
injury, he was given another job with Amtrak as a ticket 
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clerk, which paid him more than his job as a materials 
handler. See id. Although Gorniak's injury did not affect his 
ability to perform his new job, or other light-duty positions 
with Amtrak, Gorniak testified that under the seniority 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between 
his union and Amtrak, he could be displaced by a more 
senior employee if Amtrak were to cut back on its force of 
light-duty workers. See id. If that were to happen, Gorniak 
stated that the only position available within his craft at 
Amtrak might be as a materials handler, which his injury 
precluded him from performing. See id. Notwithstanding 
the evidence of Gorniak's secure employment as a ticket 
clerk and the slight probability of being precluded from 
holding any light-duty job with Amtrak, this court held that 
"the district court did not err in allowing Gorniak's lost 
earning capacity claim to go to the jury." Id. at 484. 
 
At trial Wilburn introduced evidence of both physical and 
psychological limitations caused by his traumatic 
experience that limit his economic opportunities. Dr. Steven 
Newman testified that Wilburn has permanent injury to his 
left shoulder resulting in mobility and functional limitations 
in both his shoulder and arm. With these permanent 
injuries, Wilburn is restricted from performing activities 
that involve overhead or repetitive reaching and stretching, 
pushing or pulling, and very strenuous activities. 
Performing these activities is both painful for Wilburn and 
can be expected to exacerbate the injury. Despite his 
injuries, Wilburn has continued to work as an AB 
tankerman. He compensates for his limitations by using his 
right arm and hand. 
 
Wilburn testified that as a result of his harrowing 
experience, he has a fear of sailing coastwise--that is 
leaving the sight of land. Although he has made eight to ten 
coastwise trips during good weather, he fears that if he 
were on a coastwise trip during bad weather, he would be 
unable to go out on deck to perform his mariner's duties 
even if he were ordered to do so. 
 
Dr. Robert Sadoff, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that 
Wilburn suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome, and 
his fears of sailing coastwise are consistent with that 
diagnosis. While Wilburn has made progress in overcoming 
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his fears, and has made some voyages coastwise, he would 
need to undergo a behavioral desensitization program in 
order to overcome his "realistic reasons for being afraid." 
Such a program, however, is "not practical because you 
have to deal with companies who own ships and they're not 
there for [Wilburn's] therapy." In absence of a 
desensitization program, Dr. Sadoff testified "I just don't 
think that without treatment, as I have outlined it, he's 
going to go much further than he is now. . . . [H]e's gone 
pretty far in what he's done, but he's limited and he's 
reached a kind of plateau at this point . . . ." 
 
Wilburn testified that he made a bid for a barge captain 
position, but withdrew his name when Richard Steady, 
Maritrans's port captain, told him he would never get a 
barge captain position as long as he would not go 
coastwise. Wilburn also stated that he was concerned about 
bidding on barge captain positions because as a barge 
captain, he would lose his union protection; therefore, even 
if he were successful in obtaining a barge captain position 
on an inland barge, the company could transfer him to a 
coastwise barge or fire him if he refused to go coastwise. 
Although Steady denied telling Wilburn that he would never 
become a barge captain if he were unwilling to go 
coastwise, Steady testified that an inland barge could be 
required to go coastwise. 
 
We conclude that the evidence, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to Wilburn, demonstrates a narrowing of 
Wilburn's economic opportunities and provides a sufficient 
basis upon which the jury could have decided to 
compensate Wilburn for loss of future earning capacity. The 
fact that Wilburn has continued to work as an AB 
tankerman since the accident and has compensated for his 
physical injuries by using his right arm does not preclude 
a recovery for loss of future earning capacity. Rather, those 
were factors the jury could consider in deciding whether 
Wilburn's economic prospects have been narrowed or 
whether he "is chained to his present job in a kind of 
economic servitude." Wiles, 283 F.2d at 332. Finally, while 
there is a conflict in testimony as to whether Wilburn was 
told he could never become a barge captain due to his 
psychological limitation, "[i]t was the duty of the jury to 
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resolve the conflicting testimony and it did so in favor of 
[Wilburn]." Id. at 330. 
 
B. Order Granting a Motion for a New Trial 
 
The jury awarded Wilburn a total of two million dollars in 
compensatory damages. One million dollars of that amount 
was awarded for loss of future earning capacity. Wilburn 
also seeks reversal of the district court's conditional order 
granting a new trial on the issue of damages. The district 
court held that the award of damages was against the 
weight of the evidence and excessive. 
 
This court generally reviews the grant of a new trial for 
abuse of discretion. See Klein v. Hollings, 992 F.2d 1285, 
1289 (3d Cir. 1993). "Our degree of scrutiny, however, 
differs depending on the reasons for granting the new trial." 
Id. An appellate court exercises a closer degree of scrutiny 
when the district court grants a motion for new trial 
because it believes the jury's verdict is against the weight of 
the evidence. See id. at 1290. We do so because the district 
court has " `to some extent at least, substituted [its] 
judgment for that of the jury.' " Id. (quoting Williamson v. 
Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir. 
1991) (alteration in original)). Closer scrutiny is especially 
warranted in cases involving simple factual determinations 
well within the comprehension of the jurors. See Delli Santi 
v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 201 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Despite this closer degree of scrutiny, "we recognize that 
considerable deference remains due to [the district court's] 
determination that a verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence. The trial judge observes `the witnesses and 
follow[s] the trial in a way that we cannot replicate by 
reviewing a cold record.' " Williamson v. Consolidated Rail 
Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Roebuck 
v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 735 (3d Cir. 1988)) (second 
alteration in the original). This court has also noted that 
"reversal of a judgment [as a matter of law] upon a finding 
of sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict does not 
preclude affirmance of a new trial order arising from the 
conclusion that the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence." Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 
F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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Balancing these competing interests, this court has held 
that "new trials because the verdict is against the weight of 
the evidence are proper only when the record shows that 
the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or 
where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned 
or shocks our conscience." Williamson, 926 F.2d at 1353. 
 
The district court concluded that the award of one million 
dollars for loss of future earning capacity was excessive and 
not supported by the evidence. We agree. 
 
We use the shockingly excessive standard to review jury 
verdicts, but "review the calculation methods of a jury in 
cases which are `susceptible to mathematical formula.' " 
Peco Energy Co. v. Boden, 64 F.3d 852, 858 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quoting Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 
F.2d 1265, 1279 n.19 (3d Cir. 1979)). Loss of future 
earnings capacity is subject to mathematical calculation. 
See, e.g., Williams v. Rene, 72 F.3d 1096, 1102 (3d Cir. 
1995); Gorniak v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 889 F.2d 
481 (3d Cir. 1989). "Although the determination of such 
damages often involves a host of uncertain contingencies, 
the verdict must still have its basis in evidence, not 
conjecture." Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 
143 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 
Wilburn was thirty-eight years old at the time he was 
injured. The evidence showed that he had been receiving 
$44,000 a year as an AB tankerman. The pay for a barge 
captain is $50,000 a year. Assuming a retirement age of 65, 
the gross loss of earnings would be approximately 
$162,000. That is far less than the one million dollars 
awarded by the jury. 
 
In FELA and Jones Act cases, "a defendant is`entitled to 
have the jury instructed that when future payments or 
other pecuniary benefits are to be anticipated, the verdict 
should be made up on the basis of their present value 
only.' " Gorniak, 889 F.2d at 485 (quoting St. Louis 
Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson, 470 U.S. 409, 411 
(1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
While making the present value determination is a job for 
the jury, not the court, see id., the plaintiff has the burden 
"to produce evidence permitting a rational reduction to 
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present value . . . ." Id. at 486. We noted the following in 
Gorniak: 
 
       In most of the reduction to present value cases which 
       have been decided by this court the principal focus has 
       been on whether the plaintiff produced sufficient 
       evidence to guide the jury in determining an 
       appropriate discount factor and in performing the 
       mathematical calculations involved in reducing an 
       award to present value. In these cases the dangers that 
       the juries' damage awards were based on mere 
       conjecture or guesswork were too high to support the 
       awards, since the juries had been provided with no 
       guidance as to the appropriate formula to use to 
       reduce the awards. In Russell, for example, we held 
       that "[t]he determination of the appropriate interest 
       rate and the computation of present value on the basis 
       of it involve[ ] facts and mathematical procedures of 
       which the jury could not be assumed to have personal 
       knowledge from their own prior experience. They were, 
       therefore, entitled to receive evidence and appropriate 
       mathematical guidance with respect to these matters if 
       they were to act rationally and not upon mere 
       conjecture or guess." 
 
Id. at 486 n.4 (quoting Russell v. City of Wildwood, 428 
F.2d 1176, 1183 (3d Cir. 1970)) (other citations omitted). 
 
Here, the jury was instructed to reduce the loss of future 
earning capacity award to its present value, however, 
Wilburn presented no evidence to guide the jury in its 
determination. On this basis alone, we would be required to 
determine that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting a new trial on Wilburn's loss of future 
earning capacity. 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion infinding 
that the jury's award of one million dollars for loss of future 
earning capacity was not supported by the evidence and 
was excessive. 
 
The district court also held that the jury's award of one 
million dollars for Wilburn's physical and psychological 
damage was excessive and not supported by the evidence. 
Wilburn suffered injuries to his left shoulder and knee. 
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Physical therapy has improved the condition of his knee. 
His left shoulder has not responded to treatment. He has 
continued to work for Maritrans as an AB tankerman. In 
performing his duties, however, he must compensate for his 
limitations by using his right arm and hand. He is unable 
to participate in the recreational activities he formerly 
enjoyed such as wind-surfing, softball, and basketball. 
 
Wilburn's experience in being thrown overboard by a 
giant wave has caused him to suffer from a post-traumatic 
stress disorder. He is now afraid of ocean storms. He will 
not leave the sight of land if there is a chance of bad 
weather. As a result of his fear, he believes that he could 
not go on deck to perform his job if he were in a storm off 
the coast. He also feels his psychological disorder cannot be 
treated successfully. 
 
In ordering a new trial on this issue, the district court 
reasoned as follows: 
 
       Despite Wilburn's claimed fears, his psychological 
       expert testified that Wilburn has made much progress 
       over the last three and a half years and will continue to 
       improve. In addition, Wilburn has sailed coastwise 
       approximately eight to ten times and has performed his 
       duties satisfactorily. Wilburn's psychological expert has 
       opined that with up to one year of treatment, Wilburn's 
       prognosis for a full recovery is good. Although the 
       residual pain in his shoulder is permanent in nature, it 
       has not prevented Wilburn from performing his job. 
 
The record supports the district court's factualfindings. 
After returning to work after a two-months' absence, 
Wilburn did not miss a day's work in the three and one-half 
years prior to the commencement of trial. No one had 
complained that his job performance was unsatisfactory. He 
continues to exercise and stretch his shoulder in order to 
maintain as much strength in it as possible. He has not 
been required to undergo any surgical procedures. 
 
With respect to his psychological trauma, Dr. Sadoff 
testified that the symptoms Wilburn experienced after the 
accident -- flashbacks, nightmares, difficulty sleeping, and 
depression -- have all improved. His symptoms of 
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irritability, withdrawal, and excessive startle reaction have 
also improved and are likely to continue to do so. 
 
Regarding Wilburn's fear of storms at sea, Dr. Sadoff 
testified that Wilburn has a good prognosis for a complete 
recovery if he undergoes the behavioral sensitization 
program that Dr. Sadoff outlined. While Dr. Sadoff testified 
that the program is not practical to implement because it 
requires the cooperation of a company that owns ships, Dr. 
Sadoff also testified that Wilburn might be able to overcome 
his fear of storms at seas in the same manner that has 
allowed him to take several coastwise trips during good 
weather. Dr. Sadoff testified as follows: 
 
       There may be some other steps that he could take. I 
       don't think he's going to get to the point where anybody 
       is going to take him out on an excursion just for the 
       point of helping him deal with his anxieties. 
 
       But if, for example, if he's on board and there is a 
       storm and they have to go out or they are out at sea, 
       maybe going to Norfolk or up to New York, and a storm 
       comes up unexpectedly and he's on board and if he 
       handles it and deal with it -- doesn't panic and doesn't 
       run below deck -- it may be that would be an impetus 
       for the next step after that. 
       . . . 
 
       But I just can't plan for that. 
 
Dr. Sadoff also testified that he reviewed a psychiatrist 
report prepared by Dr. Harold Byron, a psychiatrist 
Wilburn was referred to by his counsel. Dr. Byron's report 
stated that Wilburn had a good prognosis for recovery with 
treatment. 
 
Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an 
award of one million dollars for Wilburn's physical and 
psychiatric disorders is excessive. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The district court erred in excluding the opinion 
testimony of lay witnesses. A judgment as a matter of law 
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must be reversed if the insufficiency of the evidence is 
attributable to the district court's evidentiary rulings. 
 
The district court properly granted the motion for a new 
trial on liability, however, for a different reason than 
asserted by the district court. Expert testimony was not 
required to establish whether Captain Hearn was negligent 
in the disconnection of the Samson line; rather, this was 
only one of several theories alleged by Wilburn. The failure 
to utilize special verdicts regarding the basis for the jury's 
findings precludes us from determining whether this was 
the theory adopted by the jury in reaching its verdict. 
Similarly, several theories of unseaworthiness were alleged. 
Because at least one of the theories of unseaworthiness was 
beyond the common knowledge of the jury, the use of a 
general verdict makes it impossible for us to decide which 
theory of liability persuaded the jury. Accordingly, we must 
affirm the order granting a new trial. 
 
The evidence was also sufficient to withstand a motion 
for a judgment as a matter of law on the question whether 
Wilburn's injuries limited his future earning capacity 
because of his fear of performing the duties of a barge 
captain on a coastwise voyage during a storm. We 
conclude, however, that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting a motion for a new trial because the 
jury's award of one million dollars for lost future earnings 
far exceeded the difference between the pay of an AB 
tankerman and that of a barge captain. 
 
The record also supports the district court's exercise of 
its discretion to grant a motion for a new trial regarding the 
award of one million dollars to compensate Wilburn for his 
physical and psychological injuries. This amount appears to 
be excessive in light of the fact that his physical injuries do 
not preclude him from performing his duties as an AB 
tankerman and his psychological condition has significantly 
improved. 
 
Upon remand, the district court is directed to enter an 
order vacating the judgment as a matter of law on the issue 
of liability and the demand for damages for lost future 
earnings. 
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AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, with directions. 
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